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Abstract:  A large amount of recent evidence finds a negative relationship between local unemployment and
wages in OECD countries, a relationship christened a ‘wage curve’. This contradicts the conventional model of
the labour market in which high unemployment regions have higher wages to compensate for search and other
costs.  This paper discovers a wage curve in South Africa, a country with several times the typical
unemployment rate of OECD countries.  The wage curve elasticity in South Africa is similar to that in OECD
countries (-0.1) but persists over a much larger range of unemployment rates, implying that unemployment can
have a large impact on wages in South Africa.   However, this wage flexibility does not extend to union wages
which are well insulated from local unemployment conditions.  The results here also shed light on the
segmentation of the labour market based on labour immobility and on the debate about the appropriate
definition of unemployment in South Africa.1
1. Introduction
The conventional model of the labour market - in which high unemployment regions
have higher wages to compensate for search and other costs - seems contradicted by a large
amount of recent evidence of a negative relationship between local unemployment and wages
in many economies.  This relationship has been called ‘the wage curve’ and claimed as an
empirical ‘law’ of economics (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994).  Using mesoeconomic
analysis
1, Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) present an impressive array of evidence in favour
of the wage curve from the US, UK, and some OECD countries.  The evidence shows that
wages are negatively related to contemporaneous unemployment, and the unemployment
elasticity of the wage has a value of approximately -0.1, so that a 10% increase in the
unemployment rate leads to a 1% decrease in wages.  This finding is now corroborated by
evidence from a large number of OECD countries. Carruth and Oswald (1987), and
Blanchflower and Oswald (1990, 1994) provide theoretical models of the labour market
consistent with the wage curve.  In a searching review article, Card (1995) does not counter
the validity of the wage curve, taking issue instead only with the interpretation of the results
and the robustness of the elasticity.
The object of this paper is to test the robustness of the wage curve relationship under
conditions of very high unemployment using data from South Africa where average
unemployment rates are 31-37% (Klasen and Woolard, 1998;  StatsSA, 1998).  These rates
are several times the typical OECD unemployment rates and twice that in urban Cote d’Ivoire
- the only African country where the wage curve has been tested (Hoddinott, 1996).  Are
wages as flexible at the high South African unemployment rates as in other countries?
When unemployment is very high, its definition itself becomes an issue.  If many
unemployed people stop actively searching for work because they become discouraged, then it
may be misleading to measure the unemployment rate by considering as unemployed only
those who actively looked for work, i.e. by the narrow definition.  At high rates, the measure
of unemployment is endogenous because the number actively seeking work itself depends
upon the unemployment rate.  The wage curve can help assessment of alternative definitions of
unemployment by showing which measure of the unemployment rate is more important in
explaining wages.  If, as an ILO report on the South African labour market (ILO, 1996, p104)
argues, those wanting work but not actively seeking (included in the broad definition of
unemployment) may be outside the labour force, we would expect the wage curve to be
steeper for narrow than for broad unemployment.
There are several further reasons why an examination of the wage curve in South
Africa is of interest.  First, estimates of the unemployment elasticity for different areas can
provide tests of labour immobility based on labour market segmentation - whether, for
instance, segmentation is clearer as between rural and urban areas or between (former)
‘homeland’ and non-homeland areas.  Second, the wage curve has implications for poverty in
South Africa.  A negative relationship means that high unemployment in a locality not only has
a direct effect on poverty among its households but also an indirect effect via the lower wages
of their employed members.  Lastly, the trade union movement is apparently powerful and
allied with the new government in South Africa, and there is an institutional framework - the
Industrial Councils and Wage Boards - to set minimum wages in much of the formal sector. It
is of interest to examine whether this implies less wage flexibility than in countries with weaker
unionisation and weaker wage-setting institutions.
                                                       
1 Applying microeconomic data and methods to macroeconomic questions.2
The paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 presents a brief theoretical analysis of the
relationships between wages and unemployment.  Section 3 provides the South African
context, and Section 4 discusses the data, model, and tests.  The empirical results appear in
Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.
2.  Unemployment and wages: theory
The literature has generally rejected the notion that the wage curve is the result of
temporary departures from competitive labour market outcomes, essentially because a wage
increase above equilibrium should raise, not lower, unemployment.  Two main forms of
explanation for a negatively sloped wage curve W = f(U) have been suggested in the literature.
One is an incentive wage hypothesis, i.e. profit-maximising firms choose to set the wage above
the competitive level in order to influence the behaviour of their employees.  This is normally
presented along the lines of the Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) efficiency wage model, to which
imperfect monitoring and the need to prevent shirking are central.  Workers have little
incentive to put in effort if the cost of shirking is low.  Firms respond by raising the wage
above the market level so as to increase the cost of job loss.  If local unemployment is high,
the difficulties of finding work are great and workers are afraid of dismissal.   This acts as a
disciplining device, so that it is not necessary for firms to pay such high efficiency wages.  The
profit-maximising efficiency wage is therefore inversely related to the unemployment rate.
This wage curve has been termed the ‘no-shirking’ curve since it shows the wage just high
enough to deter workers from shirking.  Another incentive wage mechanism concerns firms’
training costs, which depend on the rate of labour turnover (Stiglitz, 1974).  Firms raise wages
above the competitive level to discourage voluntary quits.  However, high local unemployment
increases workers’ expected costs of quitting, so decreasing the profit-maximising wage and
giving rise to a negatively-sloped wage curve.
The second rationalisation of the wage curve draws on the union bargaining model.
High local unemployment frightens workers and weakens their bargaining power in
negotiations over rent-sharing.  If trade unions worry about their unemployed as well as their
employed members, then negotiating unions may place greater weight on employment and less
on wage objectives where local unemployment is high and the chances of finding employment
consequently low.  The wage curve accordingly has a negative unemployment elasticity.
Labour economists have used the notion of compensating differentials to hypothesise
that wages and unemployment are positively correlated across space.  In fact, this hypothesis
was developed in an African context and formalised in a model by Harris and Todaro (1970):
high wages in a locality attract more workers to it until unemployment rises sufficiently to
equalise the ‘expected wage’ across localities.  The relationship, representing U = f(W), is
depicted by the curve HT in Figure 1.   However, that is not what researchers have found in
other countries: the negative wage curve, interpreted as W = f(U), is depicted by WC in the
figure. The two relationships are mutually compatible.  The HT relationship may indeed prevail
in the long run but labour may not be sufficiently mobile for HT to be observed in the short
run.  The long run effect can be picked up by the inclusion of locality dummy variables in the
wage equation, so permitting the short run wage curve WC to be isolated (Blanchflower and
Oswald, 1995, p93; Hoddinott 1996, pp1613-4).
What would be the shape of the wage curve if wages were entirely market determined?
This question is relevant to our hypothesis tests, some of which compare non-market with
market outcomes.  If labour is perfectly mobile, a single market wage is established (apart
from compensating differences for local amenities).  However, the (voluntary) unemployment
rate is also invariant (apart from differences arising from local tastes).  The outcome is likely3
to be a wage blob rather than a curve.  If labour is perfectly immobile, as is assumed in Figure
2, local labour demand curves differ in relation to local labour supply, causing market clearing
wages to differ across labour markets (being W W 1 2 , , and W3 in the figure).  In response,
voluntary (scive) unemployment may vary inversely with the wage: a conventional wage curve
can result but it is likely to be steep.  Imperfect mobility of labour tends to reduce, but does
not eliminate, the wage differences between W W 1 2 , , and W3, and voluntary unemployment
can again generate a conventional wage curve.
Finally, there is a presumption in the existing literature that the wage curve relationship
be interpreted as W = f(U), i.e. the direction of causation is implicitly assumed to run from
unemployment to wages.  However, it is possible that a negatively sloped wage curve
represents the effect of the wage on involuntary unemployment.  In Figure 3 the supply curve
S can be downward-sloping (scive unemployment) or upward-sloping (search unemployment),
but for clarity it is assumed to be vertical, i.e. there is a fixed amount of voluntary
unemployment.  The three different local demand curves would produce market-clearing
wages W W 1 2 , , and  W3.  However, assume that incentive wage determination, or institutional
wage determination, or bargaining (conducted at a non-local level or based on comparisons)
raises the wage above the market equilibrium in localities where the latter is low.  The lower
the market-clearing wage, the greater is the gap.  This can then generate a downward-sloping
(cd>ab) wage curve WC based on involuntary unemployment, as shown in the figure.
3.  The South African context
In the apartheid years, the organisational power of African workers and their freedom
of movement were heavily controlled.  Permanent urban settlement of rural people was
prevented and even temporary labour migration was regulated to keep supply in line with
demand.  In particular, the residents of the so-called ‘homelands’ - accounting for over half of
the African population - faced limited employment opportunities and had negligible bargaining
power.   Knight (1982) argued that there was much disguised unemployment in the homelands
which reflected both the above-market wage in the formal sector, governed by incentive wage
and institutional wage determination, and also the effective rationing of formal sector jobs.  By
1993 - the year of our survey - the influx control regulations had been  recently repealed, all
workers were free to organise, and trade unions were generally recognised.
Trade unions now play an important role in wage determination in South Africa.  Their
impact was recently explored by Schultz and Mwabu (1997) using the 1993 data set.  African
unionised workers received a wage 19% higher than that received by African non-union
workers with the same observed characteristics.  Moreover, this measure may understate the
effect of unions on wages.  Although firm-level bargaining occurs as well, minimum wage
floors are set  in many industries via the agency of Industrial Councils (ICs) or Wage Boards
(WBs).  ICs are formed if enough employers in a particular sector and area get together and
negotiate.  The minimum wage agreements reached through collective bargaining within ICs
are generally extended to employers in the industry and area who are not parties to the
negotiations.  In effect, very few employers are exempt from such extension, and there are
penalties for flouting the prescribed minima.  Thus, wherever ICs operate, all workers enjoy
minimum wages and the union-nonunion distinction is less important.
WB determinations cover some of the industries not organised in ICs or, if an IC
exists, some parts of the country not covered by the IC.  In 1993 26% of the formal sector
employees were covered by ICs or WB determinations, another 31% (in mining and the public
services) were also subject to minimum wages, and 54% of the formal sector employees were4
unionised.  The commercial agriculture and domestic service sectors were effectively outside
these institutions until 1993
2.  While ICs and WBs must limit wage flexibility in South Africa,
it should be noted that most of these institutions are sub-national and impose local rather than
national wage minima.  For instance, in 1996 minimum wages for labourers in the clothing
industry ranged from 97-100 (ICs in the main metropolitan areas) to 69-76 (ICs in particular
non-metropolitan areas) to 30-36 (WBs in particular undeveloped, labour-surplus areas).
4.  Data, model, and tests
The data for this study come from the South African Living Standards Survey,
collected jointly by the World Bank and the South African Labour and Development Research
Unit (SALDRU) at the University of Cape Town in the second half of 1993. This integrated
household survey, based on the pattern of the World Bank’s LSMS surveys, produced cross-
section data on 8848 households in 360 clusters.  The sample was stratified by province, and
used a two-stage self-weighting design in which clusters were selected with probability
proportional to size, and an equal number of households selected from each cluster.  The data
contain detailed information on sample adults’ labour force participation, employment status,
earnings (wages as well as housing and transport subsidy, bonuses, and in-kind payments),
hours worked in the past week, job-search activity, occupation, industry, and employer-type.
Moreover, data are also available on food prices by cluster and on a number of individual and
household demographic characteristics.
There is no a priori guidance about what geographical boundaries are appropriate for
dividing up the country into ‘local’ labour markets for the purposes of  wage curve analysis.
In a country such as the US, a meaningful and convenient definition of the ‘local’ labour
market may be the state: variations in state labour laws probably lead to ‘different’ state labour
markets, data are routinely collected stratified by state, and there are more than 50 states.  In
South Africa, at the time of the survey, new labour market boundaries were probably emerging
as a result of the abolition of apartheid laws such as the Group Areas Act and the Influx
Control Act which previously limited the mobility of many Africans.  Thus, it is not clear what
geographical boundaries constituted meaningful ‘local’ labour markets in 1993.   Our decision
was governed by the data.  There are only 14 provinces (by the old definition) and only 9 (by
the new definition). Given that our dataset is a cross-section, the number of province-level
unemployment rate observations available is too small for reliable inferences to be drawn. Both
district and cluster boundaries are available but the use of the cluster is preferable since the
number of clusters in the dataset (360) is about double the number of districts (187)
3.
For the link between local unemployment and local wages to be meaningful, it is
important that a worker living in a particular local labour market also works in that local
labour market.  The fact that the local labour market as defined for the wage is potentially
broader than that as defined for unemployment introduces a potential source of error.
                                                       
2 The data sources are CSS (1994, pp. 2.92, 2.146, 5.3, 5.4) and ILO (1996, p145).
3 Moreover, while cluster characteristics and cluster prices are available in the dataset, there is no information
on district characteristics and district prices except by aggregation of cluster characteristics.  Furthermore, the
district unit aggregates rural and urban areas - several districts have both rural and urban clusters in them -
which may represent very different types of labour markets.  Clusters, being smaller geographical units, are
likely to represent more homogeneous labour markets.  Finally, it is well known that the standard errors in an
OLS regression are significantly downward-biased when an aggregate variable is used as an independent
variable - such as cluster/district/state unemployment rate - because of the correlation of errors across
individual observations within each cluster/district/state (Moulton, 1990).  The bigger the level of aggregation,
the larger is the scope of the bias.  From this technical point of view also, then, it seems prefer to use cluster
rather than district as the definition of the local labour market.5
Unfortunately, there is no information in the dataset on distance to work or travel to work to
enable us to identify whether an individual works in the cluster of residence.
The cluster-level ‘broad’ unemployment rate has been calculated as follows: in each
cluster, let the ‘broad’ labour force participants comprise all employed persons and all
unemployed persons, i.e. those persons who wanted work and were either looking for work in
the past week or who did not actively look for work in the past week because they believed
that no job/work was available. In accordance with these definitions, the ‘broad’
unemployment rate (URATEB) is the ratio of the number of unemployed persons to labour
force participants.  Broad unemployment includes the narrowly unemployed (those who
searched for work in the past week) and discouraged workers (those wanting work but not
actively searching in the past week). The narrow unemployment rate (URATEN) excludes
discouraged workers from both the numerator and the denominator.  It is thus the ratio of
narrowly unemployed persons to persons who either worked or looked for work in the past
week.
For the purposes of estimating the wage function, we include in our analysis persons
aged 16-64 who were residents in the cluster in which their household is situated (i.e. not
oscillating migrants), in wage employment, and for whom wages, hours worked, cluster food
prices, and cluster characteristics are available.  This yields a sample of 6498 individuals
4.
The wage function estimated is of the form:
lnW X U D ir ir r r ir = + + + b g e (1)
where Wir is the hourly wage rate for person i observed in the local labour market r,
Ur is the unemployment rate in labour market r, Dr is a vector of regional dummies,  X ir is a
set of measured characteristics of individual i such as gender, education, marriage status, race,
region, occupation, and potential experience, and eir is an error term. The logarithm of the
unemployment rate is not used on the right hand side of the wage function because in some
7% of clusters the computed unemployment rate was zero
5.
Figures 4 and 5 present a first look at the cluster level data and help to check whether
the shape of the wage curve is sensitive to outliers.  It seems that the cubic form apparent in
the simple correlation between wages and unemployment in Figure 4 occurs because of a few
outliers.  Figure 5 constrains both URATEB and wage to lie within two standard deviations of
their respective mean values at the cluster level, and it shows that when the few outlying
observations are removed, the relationship is first downward-sloping and then approximately
flat at very high rates of unemployment.  However, we have not as yet controlled for other
influences on the wage and, in order not to impose a particular form on the unemployment-
wage relationship a priori, we experiment with specifications containing quadratic, cubic, and
quartic terms of Ur .
                                                       
4 Of all ‘resident’ persons aged 16-64 who reported working in the past week in wage employment (n=8118),
earnings information is missing or incomplete for 941 individuals and hours worked information is missing for
144 persons.  Moreover, information on cluster food prices is missing for one cluster leading to the loss of 53
wage employee observations.  Finally, cluster characteristics are missing for 36 clusters altogether, which leads
to the loss of a further 482 observations.
5 Experimentation with imputing alternative small positive values to the zero unemployment rate observations
showed that the estimated wage unemployment elasticity was quite sensitive to the choice of value imputed.6
Some specification issues bear discussion.   The inclusion of regional fixed effects in
the wage equation is generally preferred because it allows the permanent component of wage
to have a correlation with the permanent component of unemployment, and uses only the
deviations of unemployment and wage from their average values to estimate the wage curve
elasticity.  Card (1995) emphasises this as the reason why the inclusion of region dummies was
an important issue in Blanchflower and Oswald’s estimation of the US wage curve
6.
However, given institutional features that prevented free movement of people until recently in
South Africa, such as the Group Areas Act, the Influx Control laws, and the confinement of
large numbers of Africans to the so called ‘homeland’ areas, we expect a large degree of
‘permanence’ in the geographical pattern of unemployment in South Africa and do not expect
regional dummies strongly to affect the wage curve elasticity.   Since our dataset is a cross-
section, only a single value for the cluster unemployment rate is available and, as a result, it is
not possible to use cluster dummies.  However, nine province dummies are available and these
are used as crude regional fixed effects.
Since the cost of living can vary substantially among regions, a specification that uses
price-deflated wages is preferable.   In the SALDRU data, price information by cluster is
available only on food prices.  A price index is created by weighting cluster food prices by
their weight in the Consumer Price Index and assuming that non-food prices are uniform
across the country.  This index is then used to deflate wages.  Deflating wages by an index of
food prices only (i.e. assuming that non-food prices vary across clusters as much as food
prices) would probably over-correct for regional price variations since food prices tend to vary
more across regions than the prices of other commodities
7.
Turning to hypothesis testing, the two main explanations for the wage curve are best
tested by estimating the unemployment elasticity of the wage for particular sub-groups.  If
efficiency wage behaviour provides the explanation for the wage curve, we expect the negative
slope to be steeper for workers who cannot be easily monitored.  If the labour turnover
argument applies, we expect the negative slope to be steeper for workers in whom the firm has
invested, such as those with much firm-specific training
8.  The test is complicated, however, by
the likelihood that workers with firm specific skills are less in danger of dismissal for shirking.
Because education and training are normally complementary, and because educated workers
are likely to be monitors (rather than the monitored), education may serve as a proxy both for
poor monitoring and firm-specific skills.  The same is true for age, length of employment
experience, and more skill-intensive and responsible occupations.  Under the bargaining power
explanation, workers with bargaining power - provided that it is localised bargaining - should
have a steeper wage curve than workers without bargaining power.  For this reason, unionised
workers may display a more elastic wage curve.  However, if bargaining is conducted
                                                       
6 Card (1995) states that for the US data the inclusion of the state fixed effects matters because average levels
of unemployment across states are weakly positively correlated with average wages, whereas ‘transitory’ wages
and unemployment rates are strongly negatively correlated.  As a result, the US wage curve elasticity tends to
be small in magnitude unless location dummies are included.  In the UK data, the addition of region dummies
does not affect the estimated wage curve elasticities, perhaps reflecting the greater degree of ‘permanence’ in
the geographic patterns of UK  unemployment, as noted by Pencavel (1994).  For the US, region dummies may
have had an important effect on the wage curve elasticity also because there were no regional price deflators
available for the US regions.
7 For example, Kanbur and Grootaert (1994)  find that in Cote d’Ivoire, non-food prices were roughly uniform
across the country but food prices varied substantially.
8 For workers whose effort input is difficult to monitor, firms need to pay them more under conditions of low
unemployment in order to raise the cost of dismissal and thus provide them with the incentive not to shirk.  For
workers with much firm-specific training, firms will need to pay higher wages under conditions of low
unemployment in order to prevent labour turnover of workers in whom they have invested.7
centrally, the reverse is the case.  Thus, for instance, public sector workers can be expected to
have a flatter wage curve than those in the private sector.  Finally, what if efficiency wage
behaviour, institutional wage setting, or non-local bargaining raise the wage above the
competitive level in low-wage areas, so generating involuntary unemployment and a negative
function U = f(W)?  We would expect the relationship to be less negative, i.e. the market
distortion to be stronger, in the case of the uneducated, the unionised, production workers,
and those employed in the public sector.  These are the characteristics which are less prone to
market wage determination.
5.  Empirical results
Table 1 presents two different specifications of the wage function, one with and the
other without the squared term of Ur , defined both broadly and narrowly.  Robust t-values
are reported rather than raw, to take account of the fact that the regression errors may be
correlated across individual workers within each cluster (Deaton, 1997, p77; Moulton, 1990).
The table shows that there is no significant relationship between narrowly measured
unemployment and wages but that there is a significant quadratic relationship between broadly
measured unemployment and wages
9.
The usual Mincer-type relationships are found between wages and productive
characteristics: for example, wages increase with experience but at a decreasing rate
10.
Marginal returns to education increase with years of education, a result similar to Moll’s
(1996b) finding that the returns to primary education are very low in South Africa.  Each of
the race groups Africans, Coloureds, and Indians earn significantly lower wages than their
white counterparts even after controlling for gender, region, productive characteristics, and
occupation, and the wage disadvantage is greatest for Africans.  We attempted to examine
how much the effect of race on wages declined when quality of schooling was accounted for,
but our efforts were thwarted by the lack of adequate data on quality of schooling
11.
Service occupations are the base category: workers in professional, clerical, and
production occupations receive higher wages, but farming workers and labourers receive
significantly lower wages than service workers.  Male, urban and married workers receive
significantly higher wages than their female, rural, and unmarried counterparts.  Controlling
for productive characteristics and institutional factors, homeland workers receive significantly
                                                       
9 The quartic U variable was insignificant in all experiments.  Though the cubic term of URATEB was
significant at the 1% level, this turned out to be due to the influence of outliers.  Upon exclusion of the very
few observations (29 out of 6498) that had a URATEB of >80% (more than three standard deviations above the
mean of URATEB at the individual level), the cubic term became insignificant. This confirms that the
quadratic shape of the wage curve seen in figure 4d is robust to the control for other factors that influence the
wage, such as personal traits, occupation, employer-type, and region of residence.  The results shown in the
tables include all observations, including outliers.
10 Experimentation with cubic and quartic terms in experience showed that their inclusion made virtually no
difference to the estimated wage curve elasticity.
11 We wanted to use cognitive skill test scores as proxies for quality of schooling received.  However, there are
several drawbacks associated with the test score data in the SALDRU survey.  Firstly, tests were administered
only to one in six of the sample households and within each of these households, it was given to only 2
members of the household, one of whom was in the age group 13-17 and one over 17.  In total, 1330
individuals older than 17 took the test, but less than 200 of these are waged workers. The test takers over the
age of 17 are split 65:35 women to men.  Although the descriptive material does not say so, it seems that the
tests were administered at times when school children were present, but when working adults were likely not to
be.  As a result, the adult test takers are predominantly women and less than a quarter report any wage income.
As Case and Deaton (1997) point out, this selection is likely to jeopardise any general inferences from the test
scores, particularly about the links between test scores and earnings.8
higher wages than non-homeland workers, though their raw, unstandardised hourly wages are
much lower.  This standardised wage premium could be interpreted as a compensating
differential for working in low-amenity homeland areas.
As expected a priori, public sector and union workers are significantly better paid than
private sector and non-union workers.  Province dummies are important, signalling that there
is significant regional variation in pay levels.   Finally, cluster variables are significant
influences on wages.  Lack of a tarred road in the cluster and greater distance to various
facilities (such as post office, bank, restaurant, phone, etc.) reduce wages.
The elasticity of wage with respect to the local unemployment rate estimated from
these and similar models is presented in Table 2.   The first row provides basic evidence on the
wage curve in South Africa as a whole.  Using the quadratic specifications in Table 1 as the
basis, the broad unemployment elasticity of the wage evaluated at the mean is nearly  -0.11.  In
other words, a doubling of broad unemployment generates an 11% reduction in wages.
However, the narrow unemployment elasticity of wage is close to zero.
The remaining rows of Table 2 provide further estimates of the wage unemployment
elasticity (WUE) under a number of alternative specifications.   It shows that departures from
the basic specification make little difference to the estimated WUE of about -0.11 using broad
unemployment and about zero using narrow unemployment, that is, the differences are not
statistically significant
12.
These findings shed new light on the on-going debate about the appropriate definition
of unemployment in South Africa.  The ILO Report (ILO, 1996, p104) argued that the broad
measure exaggerates unemployment by including in labour supply persons who did not
actively look for work in the past week (i.e. discouraged workers).  The results here show that
broadly measured unemployment has a far greater impact on wages than narrowly measured
unemployment.  In other words, discouraged workers are taken into account by wage-setters
and their numbers in a locality do influence local wage determination.  These appear to be
persuasive grounds for retaining the broad definition as the more appropriate definition of
unemployment in South Africa.
To test the alternative theories we compare the wage curves of those workers for
whom theory appears particularly apposite and of other workers.  The shirking theory might
apply more to workers whose performance is more difficult to monitor or for whom the threat
of dismissal is more credible. These might, for instance, be workers in discretionary or
supervisory jobs or workers in whom the firm has not invested heavily.   By contrast, the
labour turnover theory appears most relevant to workers in whom the firm has invested
heavily.  Thus alternative versions of the incentive wage hypothesis make different predictions.
The bargaining theory is more likely to apply to unionised workers who engage in local
bargaining and less to workers subject to non-local wage determination or to workers without
                                                       
12 The full set of regressions is available from the authors on request.  In common with Blanchflower and
Oswald (1994) and other wage curve studies, the basic specification does not correct for the sample selectivity
of waged workers.  Experimentation with the district (as opposed to cluster) unemployment rate showed that
the point estimate of the coefficient on the district broad unemployment rate (DURATEB) was lower but
insignificantly different from the point estimate of the coefficient on the cluster broad unemployment rate
(URATEB).  However, the coefficient was imprecise and insignificant at the 5% level.  This is not surprising
since the standard error of DURATEB was much higher (than of the cluster URATEB) because of fewer
district observations.  The estimated wage curve elasticity using DURATEB was -6% (t-values: -1.70 on
DURATEB and 1.67 on the square of DURATEB).9
organisation or power.  The wage curve of the relevant group should be downward-sloping
whereas that of the residual group need not be.  Unfortunately, the prediction for the residual
group is ambiguous.  If the wage is market determined the wage curve tends towards the
vertical whereas if the wage is governed by non-local bargaining, the wage curve tends
towards the horizontal.
Table 3 presents the broad unemployment elasticities of wage for different groups of
workers, disaggregated by education, experience, sector, gender, race, and region.  In South
Africa, the pay of many public sector workers is set centrally
13.  We would expect workers
whose wages are negotiated centrally to have a flatter wage curve than workers who engage in
local level bargaining. In line with this hypothesis, Table 3 shows that the wage curve is
substantially flatter for public than for private sector workers.
A comparison of union and non-union workers in Table 3 shows that unionised
workers’ wages do not respond negatively to local unemployment rate at all
14. The bargaining
hypothesis implies that the wage curve exists when local bargaining takes place but not if
bargaining is national or regional: non-local bargaining insulates workers’ pay from local
labour market conditions.  In South Africa, much union bargaining is non-local and unionised
workers are in a better position to ensure that IC non-local wage agreements are implemented
by recalcitrant employers who were not party to the IC wage negotiations.  Thus, the results
for unionised workers (proxying bargained wages) are as expected.  We are left to explain the
results for non-unionised workers.
Table 3 shows that the wages of older, more experienced, and more educated workers
are less sensitive to local unemployment than are those of younger, less experienced, and less
educated workers.  These former characteristics are liable to encourage efficiency wage setting
so as to avoid shirking, whereas the latter are more likely to produce market wage setting.
The results are thus in line with one version of the efficiency wage rationalisation of the wage
curve.
The fact that women have a very flat wage curve may be due to our use of the overall
cluster unemployment rate, rather than the gender-specific unemployment rate.  If women’s
and men’s jobs are not substitutes (as may be the case in certain occupations and industries,
e.g. mining, domestic work and health care), then the relevant unemployment rate to use is the
gender-specific one.  There is support for this hypothesis.  When we use gender-specific
unemployment rates, the wage-unemployment elasticity is marginally lower for males than for
females:     -0.040 for males (t= -2.8, 3.2) and -0.063 for females (t = -2.7)
15.
Table 3 also shows that the wages of rural workers are about as flexible with respect to
local labour market conditions as those of urban workers.  By contrast, while a highly
significant negative wage curve elasticity is obtained for non-homeland areas, homeland wages
are not negatively related to unemployment in South Africa.  The wages of non-African
                                                       
13 But not in all cases, e.g., provincial administrations and local governments may set their own wages and
these may take account of local labour market conditions.
14 Union membership information is available only for regular wage workers and not for casual wage workers.
We have assumed that none of the casual workers are unionised. However, if some are unionised, as is likely,
then the true UEW for non-union workers should be greater (i.e. a bigger negative) than the reported figure.
15 For women, the wage-unemployment relationship is linear. Although it may be desirable to use gender-
specific unemployment rates in wage curve estimation, computing the gender-specific unemployment rate
implies that only about half the number of labour force participant observations are available for each gender
and the sample sizes become too small for reliable estimates of the cluster unemployment rates.10
workers are apparently substantially more responsive to unemployment than are those of
African workers but this arises from their enforce spatial concentrations.  As will be seen later,
non-Africans are concentrated in low unemployment regions, i.e. regions where the wage
curve is steeply downward sloping, whereas Africans are concentrated in high unemployment
clusters where the wage curve is flatter.
Table 1 showed that South Africa apparently has a U-shaped wage curve, with the
minimum point occurring at a broad unemployment rate of 36%.  Is the nature of the wage-
unemployment relationship significantly different between South Africa and other countries?
In their analysis of wage curves in the UK and USA, Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) did find
that a substantial part of the wage curve slopes upward, and they said that this “might, in
principle, reflect Harris-Todaro forces, although such an interpretation would be highly
speculative” (p106).  They suggest (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1993, p245) that the upward-
sloping part of the wage curve in UK and USA rests on small numbers of observations in the
high unemployment portion of the curves and on wage functions in which it was not possible
to control fully for regional and industry fixed effects.  They also argue that since the upward-
sloping part occurs at very high rates of unemployment which are not observed in the actual
data, one could reasonably ignore that part of the wage curve.  However, one cannot dismiss
the upward-sloping part in the South African wage curve because a significant minority (27%)
of wage employees live in clusters in which the broad unemployment rate is greater than 36%.
To explore further the nature of the wage-unemployment spatial relationship, we
sought to divide the country into low and high unemployment regions. We expected
unemployment to be quite different in rural and urban parts of the country.  However, Tables
4a and 4b show that the rural-urban division does not capture labour market segmentation in
the South African labour market well and that the clearest labour market fault-line occurs
along ‘homeland’-non homeland lines.   Broadly measured unemployment is catastrophically
high in the (former) homeland regions, and it is much lower in non-homeland regions.
Consequently, we fitted separate wage functions for homeland and non-homeland regions
(Appendix Table 1). A Chow test rejected the pooling of the two samples.
The first row in Table 5 shows that homeland South Africa - with its very high
unemployment rates - exhibits no significant relationship between local unemployment and
wages. This flatness of the wage curve suggests that at the disastrously high levels of
unemployment found in homeland areas, relatively small changes in unemployment do not
affect wages.  This may be because the high levels of unemployment reflect long duration of
unemployment (rather than high inflow into unemployment) and the obsolescence of human
capital and skills of the long-term unemployed mean that they provide less competition for
jobs, so that their presence in the labour force exerts little downward pressure on wages.
However, non-homeland South Africa displays a significant convex relationship
between unemployment and wage, with a WUE of -0.111:  a doubling of the unemployment
rate there leads to a 11.1% reduction in wages.  The minimum point occurs at a high broad
unemployment rate of 36%.  Since the vast majority (87%) of the non-homeland workers live
in clusters which have a unemployment rate below 36%, the downward-sloping part of the
wage curve is the more relevant.
The wage curve elasticities estimated for different groups of workers in homelands and
non-homelands are presented from the second row onwards in Table 5.  Since in the case of
the homeland areas, there is no significant non-linear relationship between unemployment and
pay, and since in non-homelands, the downward sloping part of the wage curve is the more11
relevant, we refer to the elasticities in the linear columns.  The elasticities for different groups
of workers in homelands are almost invariably insignificant. The elasticities for different
groups of workers in non-homelands South Africa show that the results are quite similar to
those for South Africa as a whole in Table 3, and bear the same interpretations.  There is,
however, one interesting difference.  In rural non-homelands, with their low unemployment
rates, wages are three times as responsive to unemployment as urban non-homeland wages.
This is likely to be because wages tend to be less determined by bargaining in rural non-
homelands - home of South African non-subsistence agriculture - because employers are
smaller, there is little unionisation of agricultural workers, and the dominant rural industry
(farming) was not covered by an Industrial Council in 1993.
Table 6 sets out the wage curve elasticities by industry/sector in non-homeland areas,
the part of South Africa where a negative relationship exists
16.  In all sectors except the two
smallest (electricity and restaurant/entertainment), there is a large negative wage curve
elasticity.  The elasticity is low - a small negative - in ‘other sectors’, i.e. in educational, legal,
medical, and armed forces sectors where public sector workers are concentrated and
centralised bargaining is likely to determine wages.  The wage curve elasticity is high (a large
negative) in agriculture, fishing, and forestry industry where there is little institutional wage
determination.  The elasticity is also high in transport and construction sectors where the large
majority of workers are non-unionised.  While some sub-industries within these sectors are
covered by IC agreements, the relevant ICs are very localised and their wage agreements are
likely to take local market wages and local unemployment rates into account.
We are interested not only in the shape of the wage curve but also in the size of the
wage curve elasticity over a range of unemployment.  Table 7 shows that in non-homelands,
the unemployment rate can be tripled from 10% to 30% without reducing the wage curve
elasticity below about -0.1.  In South Africa as a whole, the unemployment rate can be
increased two-and-a-half times from 10% -25% without reducing the size of the wage curve
elasticity below about -0.1.  In other words, the wage-unemployment elasticity is robust over a
large range of unemployment.
Until now both the dependent variable and all the independent variables except the
unemployment rate and cluster characteristics were measured at the individual level.
Unemployment was measured at the aggregate, i.e. cluster, level.  The fact that the
unemployment variable Ur  in equation (1) has no i subscript has an important implication.  It
is reasonable to expect that individuals living in the same locality may share some common
unobservable characteristics that would lead the regression disturbances to be correlated
within the cluster.  Following Moulton (1990), it can be shown that even small levels of such
correlation can cause conventional standard errors of Ur  to be significantly downward-biased,
resulting in spurious findings of statistical significance of Ur .  All the regressions reported
thus far show t-values based on standard errors corrected for this possible source of bias.
However, as a further test of the robustness of the wage curve elasticity, we estimate a model
using cluster means of characteristics instead of individual observations. Making the level of
aggregation same on both sides of the wage function eliminates the downward bias on the
standard errors.
                                                       
16 While one would expect that workers in industries where ICs exist will have flatter wage curves than other
workers, in practice it is not straight-forward to test this.  This is because ICs are organised for sub-industries
rather than for the broad industrial categories available in the dataset.  Most ICs also cover small areas, not
large regions, so they may apply to some but not all workers in a given industry.12
The wage functions using cluster-level means of hourly wages and individual
characteristics are presented in Table 8 and the elasticities computed from these regressions
are contained in Table 9.  Table 9 shows that, when aggregate data are introduced, the
estimated wage unemployment elasticity falls from about -0.11 to about -0.07 for all South
Africa, and the coefficient on unemployment ceases to be significant.  However, for non-
homeland South Africa, the elasticity is virtually unaffected and the coefficient of
unemployment is still significant at the 1% level.
A further issue of importance is the potentially simultaneous determination of
unemployment and wages:  it is possible that unemployment does not merely affect wage but
is itself a function of wage.  Since the effect of endogeneity will be to impart an upward bias
on the parameters of unemployment, correcting for endogeneity bias should raise the elasticity
(produce a larger negative coefficient).
A correction for the endogeneity of U r requires plausible instruments.  The
instruments most often used in the literature are lagged local unemployment rates but, given
our cross-section data, lagged unemployment rate is not available to us.  We employ a number
of cluster characteristics as instruments for the cluster unemployment rate, using those cluster
level variables as instruments that are insignificant in the wage equation but which are well
correlated with unemployment
17.  Table 10 shows that in each case (homeland, non-homeland,
and all South Africa) the elasticity estimated from the 2SLS model is larger (a bigger negative
coefficient) than that from the corresponding OLS model.  This is consistent with the existence
of an even steeper wage curve than previously reported in Tables 3 and 5.   In the non-
homeland case, the 2SLS result is highly significant, both in the linear and quadratic forms.
The fact that the negatively-sloped wage curve does not disappear when we allow for the
endogeniety of unemployment in the wage regression is consistent with causality running from
unemployment to wages in South Africa
18.
Our final issue concerns the comparability of wage flexibility in South Africa and other
countries.  Whereas the relevant definition of the unemployment rate for South Africa is the
broad definition - as argued earlier - the definition of unemployment used in wage curve
analyses in OECD countries (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994) and in urban Cote d’Ivoire
                                                       
17 Different sets of instruments were used for U in the 2SLS estimation of wages in the three sectors
(homelands, non-homelands, and all S. Africa).  They included the following variables: whether community
has roads that become impassable at certain times of the year, whether community has any public transport
passing by it, distance to nearest transport, whether the main religion in the community is Christianity, number
of facilities in the community such as post offices, banks, restaurants, markets, etc. Several of these variables
can plausibly be thought of as influencing unemployment but not wages: for example, condition of roads,
availability of transport, and distance to nearest transport are all variables that are likely to affect
unemployment (because they affect the cost of job-search) but they are not thought to influence earnings
directly.  Following Bound et al (1995), in Table 10 we report both the partial  R
2 and the F-statistic of the
identifying instruments in the first stage estimation.  These indicate the quality of our 2SLS estimates: the
partial  R
2’s are high, as are the F-statistics of the joint significance of the identifying instruments.  We also
report the more common F-test of the validity of overidentifying instruments which shows that in each sector,
the identifying instruments pass the overidentification test.  The full set of results, including first stage
estimates, are available from the authors upon request.
18 Following Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996), two conditions must be fulfilled for the identification of
causal effects using instrumental variables in our model: (1) the correlation of the instrument of U with the
error term in the wage equation should be zero and (2) the covariance of U and the instrument of U should be
significantly different from zero. The test of the validity of overidentifying restrictions showed that the
identifying instruments are jointly insignificant in the wage regression, fulfilling the first condition.  The
partial R-squares and the F-tests of the joint significance of the identifying instruments in the first stage
regression of U showed that the second condition is also fulfilled.13
(Hoddinott, 1996) is based on the narrow concept.   It may reasonably be argued that any
comparison of wage flexibility in South Africa and other countries requires that the narrow
definition of unemployment be used for South Africa.  Moreover, whereas the homeland/non-
homeland segmentation was the most relevant for South Africa, the urban/rural division is
necessary for comparison with other countries:  for example, in Africa, a wage curve has been
explored only for urban Cote d’Ivoire.  Wage curve analyses for OECD countries are
effectively predominantly urban analyses since only a very small proportion of the population
in these countries lives in rural areas, and rural unemployment rates are very low.
Consequently, in Table 11 we present unemployment elasticities of wage by definition of
unemployment and region.
The table shows that using the narrow definition of unemployment, the wage-
unemployment elasticity in urban areas is - 0.08, that is, close to the -0.10 found for OECD
countries and the -0.12 found for urban Cote d’Ivoire.  In urban South Africa, an increase of
10% in the narrowly measured unemployment rate causes wages to fall by 0.8%.  On the other
hand, in rural South Africa, narrow unemployment exerts a positive but insignificant impact on
wages.  These different results for urban and rural areas are not implausible since the mobility
of African workers was much greater within homeland (predominantly rural) areas than within
non-homeland (predominantly urban) areas.
6.  Conclusion
The existence of a wage curve has been the subject of intensive discussion, primarily
using OECD data where unemployment rates are typically 5-12% (Blanchflower and Oswald,
1994, p297).  The robustness of the wage curve, both across countries and across ranges of
unemployment rates, has become an interesting question.  In this paper we examine the wage
curve  where unemployment rates average about 30%.
The paper illuminates the important debate about the relevant definition of
unemployment in South Africa.  The analysis indicates that the broad definition of
unemployment is the appropriate one for labour market analysis in South Africa since local
wage determination takes discouraged workers into account as genuine labour force
participants.
We find that the wage curve elasticity is extremely robust over a wide range of
unemployment. Tripling unemployment from 10% to 30% reduces wages by approximately
30% in the data.  The wage curve was subjected to a range of robustness tests - allowing for
possible endogeneity, dividing the workers into high/low unemployment rate areas, dividing
the sample into different groups of workers, and allowing for the correlation of errors across
individuals within regions - but none of these reduces the wage curve elasticity below about -
0.10 over the range of unemployment between 10% and 30%.  At rates of unemployment
above 30%, the wage unemployment elasticity falls to zero.
Our estimates of the elasticity of the wage curve for various sub-groups generally
correspond to those in other studies.  Like Blanchflower and Oswald (1995, pp. 148-67, 258,
261, 342, 349-51) and Hoddinott (1996, pp. 1618-19), we found that younger, less
experienced, less educated, non-unionised, and private sector workers tend to have steeper
wage curves.  This suggests that the free-market tendency (proxied by youth, low skill, and
weak organisation) is towards a vertical wage curve, and that non-local bargaining (proxied by
union membership and the public sector) is towards a horizontal wage curve.  The elasticities
for older, experienced, and educated workers are consistent with the efficiency wage
rationalisation of the wage curve, and the elasticity for private sector workers with the local14
bargaining explanation.  It also appears that unions, often bargaining at the non-local level,
limit the impact of local unemployment on wages in South Africa.
Fallon and Lucas (1998) have produced time series evidence showing that the South
African employment elasticity of the wage is large and negative (-0.7) so that, over time, a
10% increase in wages is estimated to lead to a 7% fall in employment.  Such a fall in
employment is likely to result in a rise in unemployment.  Thus, over time, there appears to
exist a positive relationship between wages and unemployment.  By contrast, our evidence of a
wage curve suggests that, across space, there is a negative relationship between
unemployment and wages.   However, this apparent contradiction would be consistent with an
exogenous rise in the wage curve over time, probably associated with increased bargaining
power.  This would generate a new equilibrium higher up the labour demand curve, involving
a higher wage and more unemployment.15
Table 1
Wage functions - South Africa
Variables Narrowly defined unemployment Broadly defined unemployment Variable
Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Means
Coefficient robust t-value Coefficient robust t-value Coefficient robust t-value Coefficient robust t-value
Constant 0.41530 3.29 0.41624 3.30 0.40880 3.25 0.42868 3.49
EXP 0.03500 9.65 0.03488 9.63 0.03522 9.65 0.03488 9.53 22.830
EXPSQ -0.00052 -8.09 -0.00052 -8.06 -0.00052 -8.06 -0.00052 -7.93 669.000
EDYRS 0.00292 0.26 0.00278 0.25 0.00371 0.33 0.00423 0.38 7.945
EDYRSQ 0.00438 5.36 0.00439 5.39 0.00435 5.34 0.00434 5.43 79.830
AFRICAN -0.65287 -8.35 -0.63705 -7.75 -0.61136 -7.59 -0.52619 -6.01 0.654
COLORED -0.46569 -6.53 -0.45121 -5.93 -0.43933 -6.15 -0.35170 -4.36 0.113
INDIAN -0.47458 -5.86 -0.45869 -5.51 -0.45629 -5.76 -0.38390 -4.74 0.045
MALE 0.34432 14.68 0.34471 14.70 0.34275 14.78 0.33956 14.90 0.580
MARRIED 0.14348 5.62 0.14281 5.61 0.13825 5.40 0.13850 5.41 0.731
PROF 0.72173 15.67 0.72038 15.75 0.71946 15.67 0.71084 15.78 0.175
CLER 0.29748 8.61 0.29758 8.62 0.30164 8.77 0.30343 8.89 0.194
FARM -0.57613 -4.95 -0.57690 -4.97 -0.57843 -5.00 -0.55614 -4.89 0.042
PROD 0.21757 5.51 0.21861 5.51 0.22276 5.68 0.23183 6.00 0.199
LABO -0.07583 -1.49 -0.07584 -1.50 -0.07188 -1.44 -0.07700 -1.59 0.225
URBAN 0.31035 3.62 0.32314 3.87 0.33431 4.02 0.38644 5.06 0.637
PUBLIC 0.16974 5.70 0.16945 5.69 0.17194 5.83 0.17303 5.87 0.244
UNION 0.28513 8.26 0.28669 8.33 0.28453 8.35 0.27752 8.51 0.259
WCAPE -0.14876 -2.45 -0.14808 -2.42 -0.14928 -2.48 -0.15864 -2.52 0.125
NCAPE -0.27456 -1.38 -0.27766 -1.40 -0.25009 -1.35 -0.26668 -1.46 0.012
ECAPE -0.18906 -2.53 -0.21010 -2.55 -0.15994 -2.12 -0.19780 -2.71 0.067
NATAL -0.16870 -3.01 -0.17489 -3.06 -0.17153 -3.10 -0.18518 -3.35 0.185
OFS -0.41103 -4.03 -0.41727 -4.17 -0.41805 -4.15 -0.40964 -4.34 0.094
ETVL -0.07595 -0.65 -0.07976 -0.69 -0.08254 -0.72 -0.08105 -0.74 0.075
NTVL -0.16602 -2.35 -0.17274 -2.39 -0.16845 -2.33 -0.19387 -2.66 0.064
NW -0.01772 -0.18 -0.02993 -0.30 -0.03222 -0.34 -0.04916 -0.52 0.104
DISFACI -0.00037 -2.18 -0.00037 -2.16 -0.00035 -2.00 -0.00040 -2.09 68.620
TARROAD 0.22084 2.78 0.21941 2.79 0.20996 2.75 0.18508 2.71 0.399
HOMELAND 0.26348 3.85 0.27579 4.05 0.30061 4.35 0.33023 4.98 0.260
URATE 0.11563 0.64 -0.24657 -0.52 -0.16489 -1.17 -1.30530 -3.27 0.233 b, 0.107n *
URATESQ 0.87780 0.89 1.80330 3.46
Adjusted R-square 0.5884 0.5886 0.5887 0.5918
Dependent variable Mean = 1.56101, SD= 1.1113
N 649816
Note: The base category for occupation is ‘service’ and for province is PWV/Gauteng.  Other reference categories are white, rural, female, and unmarried.  * b=broad, n=narrow.
Note: EXP=potential experience; EXPSQ=square of EXP; EDYRS=years of education; EDYRSQ=square of EDYRS; AFRICAN, COLOURED, and INDIAN are race dummies (base
category is WHITE); MALE and MARRIED are gender and marital status dummies (base categories are female and non-married); PROF, CLER, FARM, PROD, and LABO are
occupation dummies for professional, clerical, farming, production, and labourer workers respectively (base category is SERVICE workers); URBAN and HOMELAND are region
dummies and PUBLIC and UNION are dummies for public sector worker and unionised worker;  TARROAD and DISFACI are cluster characteristics (whether cluster has tarred roads
and distance from cluster to various facilities such as banks, post office, restaurants, markets, etc);  URATEB=broadly measured unemployment rate; URATEBSQ= square of URATEB;
The remaining variables are province dummies, the reference province being PWV or Gauteng.
Standard errors reported are robust (rather than raw) i.e. they take account of the fact that regression errors may be correlated across individual workers within a cluster.  The effect of
correcting standard errors is to raise them substantially, reducing the size of the t-values.  For example, the raw t-value of the variable URATE (broad) was -2.35 (i.e. apparently
significant at the 1% level) but the robust t-value is -1.17 which is insignificant.  Similarly, the raw t-values of URATE and URATESQ (broad) were -7.43 and 7.07 but the robust ones
are less than half that size (-3.27 and 3.46 respectively).17
Table 2
Unemployment elasticity of wage
South Africa, 1993
Specification Narrowly defined unemployment Broadly defined unemployment
Coefficient t-value elasticity Coefficient t-value elasticity
raw robust raw robust
Basic specification
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Exclude ‘public’ and ‘union’ dummies
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Include only those workers who worked >=35
hours in past week (N=5699)
         Unemployment rate
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Wage unemployment elasticity, by worker group
All  South Africa











































































































































































Note:  High education workers are those with greater than or equal to 10 years’ schooling; High experience
workers are those with greater than or equal to 25 years’ experience; and older workers are those greater than
or equal to 40 years of age.   The t-statistics in the last column refer to the coefficients of Ur  and U r
2 .19
Table 4a
Broad unemployment rates, by region
Homelands % Non-homelands % Total %
Rural 50.0 14.0 40.8
Urban 39.8 22.1 23.9
Total 48.5 20.7 31.2
Table 4b
Unemployment rates by region and alternative definition
Region Individual level unemployment
rate (%)











Homeland 18.6 48.5 14.9 39.8 24.9
Non-homeland 10.7 20.7 9.2 17.5 8.3
Rural 14.0 40.8 9.3 28.2 18.9
Urban 12.5 23.9 11.5 20.6 9.1
All South Africa 13.1 31.2 10.7 23.3 12.6
Note:  The unemployment rates calculated from data on all individual labour force participants in given regions
(e.g. homeland, non-homeland, rural, and urban) are generally somewhat higher than the cluster
unemployment rates averaged across all clusters in a region.20
Table 5
Wage unemployment elasticity, by homeland/non-homeland and worker group
Homeland Non-homeland
Worker group N Linear Quadratic N Linear Quadratic
(mean urateb) Elasticity t-value Elasticity t-value (mean urateb) Elasticity t-value Elasticity t-value
All 1690
(0.3979)
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(0.0965)




Note:  High education workers are those with >=10 years’ schooling; High experience workers are those with  >=25 years’ experience; and older workers are those  >=40 years of age.




Elasticity of the wage curve in Non-homeland areas, by industry
All wage workers Non-unionised wage workers
Industry N Linear Quadratic N Linear Quadratic
Agriculture/fishing/forestry 692 -0.133 *** -0.262 *** 664 -0.117 *** -0.245 ***
Mining 380 -0.082 *** -0.141 * 87 -0.252 *** -0.381 *
Manufacturing 726 -0.093 -0.155 *** 387 -0.130 -0.196 *
Electricity and water 78 -0.119 -0.317 50 -0.168 -0.342
Construction 264 -0.147 -0.227 ** 212 -0.062 -0.195 **
Wholesale and retail 549 -0.176 *** -0.224 *** 421 -0.166 *** -0.222 **
Restaurants/entertainment 138 -0.017 0.158 123 -0.070 -0.233
Transport & communication 334 -0.285 *** -0.539 *** 220 -0.450 *** -0.661 ***
Domestic 473 -0.112 ** -0.126 ** 458 -0.113 ** -0.127 **
Other sectors - finance,
legal, education, medical, &
armed forces
1660 -0.062 ** -0.058 1345 -0.027 -0.031
Note: The wage equations from which these elasticities are computed have the same specification as in Table 1 except that the occupation dummy variables have been removed
here because not all occupational categories were relevant in each sector/industry.  For example, among domestic sector workers, there weren’t any farmers, professionals, or
clerical workers.  In certain equations, the race dummy variable ‘Indian’ was also dropped due to no/too few Indian workers in that industry.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.22
Table 7
Wage curve elasticity over a range of unemployment rates
Unemployment rate Wage-unemployment Elasticity
Non-Homeland Homeland All South Africa
5 -0.079 0.007 -0.056
10 -0.133 0.014 -0.094
15 -0.161 0.021 -0.115
20 -0.164 0.028 -0.117
25 -0.141 0.034 -0.101
30 -0.092 0.040 -0.067
35 -0.017 0.046 -0.015
40  0.083 0.052  0.04823
Table 8
Aggregate-data wage functions
Variable All South Africa Homelands Non-homelands
Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic
coefficient t value coefficient t value coefficient t value coefficient t value coefficient t value coefficient t value
INTERCEP -1.2156 -2.96 -1.1737 -2.85 -2.2005 -3.43 -2.5093 -3.59 -0.9443 -2.17 -0.7578 -1.71
EXP 0.0555 2.46 0.0506 2.21 0.0477 1.37 0.0530 1.51 0.0643 2.22 0.0521 1.77
EXPSQ -0.0006 -1.57 -0.0005 -1.30 -0.0004 -0.60 -0.0005 -0.79 -0.0011 -2.04 -0.0009 -1.63
EDYRS 0.1951 3.77 0.2046 3.91 0.1944 2.29 0.1752 2.02 0.2144 3.34 0.2065 3.24
EDYRSQ -0.0049 -1.12 -0.0055 -1.24 -0.0037 -0.45 -0.0024 -0.29 -0.0067 -1.41 -0.0066 -1.41
AFRICAN -0.5319 -3.61 -0.4630 -2.93 -0.1673 -1.19 -0.0933 -0.65
COLORED -0.4814 -3.11 -0.4318 -2.69 -0.2699 -2.11 -0.1973 -1.49
INDIAN -0.4904 -2.97 -0.4642 -2.79 -0.4017 -3.04 -0.3627 -2.74
PUBLIC 0.2915 2.23 0.2914 2.23 0.3887 1.81 0.3854 1.80 -0.1862 -1.14 -0.1911 -1.18
UNION 0.4349 3.12 0.4322 3.10 0.4309 1.62 0.4196 1.57 0.4647 3.27 0.4542 3.22
MARRIED 0.3467 2.37 0.3517 2.41 0.5047 2.42 0.5199 2.49 0.0664 0.34 0.1069 0.55
MALE 0.6749 4.71 0.6612 4.60 0.7670 3.28 0.7676 3.28 0.4936 2.72 0.4875 2.72
PROF 1.1715 4.34 1.1345 4.18 0.9883 2.19 1.0514 2.31 1.4958 5.05 1.4857 5.06
CLER 0.3106 1.27 0.2895 1.18 0.4332 1.07 0.4953 1.21 0.0415 0.16 0.0953 0.36
FARM -0.4819 -1.91 -0.4974 -1.97 -0.3229 -0.65 -0.2789 -0.56 -0.8358 -3.03 -0.8483 -3.10
PROD 0.3833 1.52 0.3722 1.48 0.6686 1.58 0.7420 1.74 0.1278 0.45 0.1519 0.54
LABO 0.0291 0.15 0.0020 0.01 0.2517 0.88 0.3112 1.07 -0.2972 -1.29 -0.3564 -1.55
URBAN 0.1572 1.94 0.1764 2.14 0.0660 0.46 0.0595 0.42 0.3473 3.75 0.3532 3.85
HOMELAND 0.1871 2.03 0.1948 2.11
WCAPE -0.0518 -0.45 -0.0522 -0.45 0.0490 0.56 0.0570 0.65
NCAPE -0.4258 -2.07 -0.4150 -2.01 -0.2452 -1.56 -0.2407 -1.55
ECAPE -0.1265 -1.19 -0.1254 -1.18 -0.0415 -0.39 -0.0712 -0.66
NATAL -0.1733 -1.77 -0.1651 -1.68 0.0021 0.02 0.0042 0.05
OFS -0.4632 -4.29 -0.4627 -4.28 -0.3934 -4.66 -0.3989 -4.77
ETVL -0.0929 -0.79 -0.0810 -0.69 0.1571 1.30 0.1317 1.09
NTVL -0.2072 -1.79 -0.2046 -1.77 0.2893 1.69 0.2325 1.35
NW -0.1453 -1.32 -0.1455 -1.32 0.0722 0.60 0.0553 0.47
TARROAD 0.1288 1.59 0.1216 1.49 0.1871 0.78 0.1960 0.81 0.0874 1.34 0.0896 1.39
DISFACI -0.0001 -0.72 -0.0001 -0.78 0.0000 -0.10 -0.0001 -0.25 -0.0002 -1.02 -0.0002 -1.08
URATEB -0.0980 -0.62 -0.5994 -1.33 0.0415 0.16 1.2795 1.12 -0.5969 -2.78 -1.4386 -2.97
URATEBSQ 0.5936 1.19 -1.2200 -1.11 1.5330 1.93
Adjusted  R
2 0.7554 0.7557 0.4291 0.4301 0.9000 0.9018





Wage unemployment elasticity, using individual and aggregate data
Specification All South Africa Non-homelands Homelands
Coeff t-value elasticity Coeff t-value elasticity Coeff t-value elasticity
Linear
    Individual data




















    Individual data
































    Individuals







Note:  The unemployment rate for a region (eg homeland or non-homeland) calculated from all individual labour force participants in that region
differs somewhat from the average of the cluster unemployment rates averaged across all clusters in that region.  See note in Table 4.25
Table 10
Wage unemployment elasticity estimated from OLS and Two stage least squares regressions
Specification All South Africa Non-homelands Homelands
Coeff t-value elasticity Coeff t-value elasticity Coeff t-value elasticity
Linear
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N 6498 4808 1690
Note:  The partial  R
2 of U is the adjusted  R
2in the regression of U on the identifying instruments. The partial  R
2 of U2 is the adjusted  R
2in the
regression of URATEBSQ on the identifying instruments.  F statistic U is the F-statistic of the joint significance of the identifying instruments in
the first stage regression of U and F uratebsq is the equivalent in the regression of U2.  F Overid is the F statistic of the test of overidentifying
restrictions.26
Table 11
Unemployment elasticity of wage by definition of unemployment and region
Region Narrow definition Broad definition









































Note: * represents significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.  Robust t-values reported.27
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Figure 4: Unconstrained cluster data
cluster unemployment rate








































Figure 5: U and wage within 2 s.d. of their means
cluster unemployment rate







Wage functions for homelands and non-homelands
Variable Homelands Non-homelands
Linear Quadratic Mean Linear Quadratic Mean
coefficient robust t coefficient robust t coefficient robust t coefficient robust t
Constant -0.58168 -3.68 -0.58556 -2.59 0.42662 2.78 0.47168 3.07
EXP 0.04869 6.81 0.04870 6.80 24.170 0.03279 7.55 0.03217 7.40 22.360
EXPSQ -0.00070 -5.76 -0.00070 -5.74 745.700 -0.00049 -6.33 -0.00048 -6.21 642.000
EDYRS 0.01761 1.01 0.01759 1.01 7.390 -0.00519 -0.38 -0.00607 -0.46 8.140
EDYRSQ 0.00451 3.15 0.00451 3.17 70.950 0.00464 4.93 0.00468 5.06 82.960
AFRICAN -0.53213 -5.74 -0.48921 -5.05 0.533
COLORED -0.40456 -5.71 -0.33623 -4.03 0.153
INDIAN -0.52212 -5.70 -0.44964 -4.70 0.060
MALE 0.37145 8.19 0.37146 8.19 0.551 0.33329 12.49 0.33430 12.59 0.590
MARRIED 0.18200 3.55 0.18207 3.52 0.674 0.12415 4.44 0.12841 4.55 0.752
PROF 0.79624 8.67 0.79654 8.62 0.156 0.67337 13.14 0.67208 13.29 0.181
CLER 0.32779 4.44 0.32794 4.48 0.168 0.27959 7.43 0.28781 7.63 0.203
FARM -0.39829 -2.85 -0.39837 -2.84 0.025 -0.58432 -4.08 -0.56016 -4.00 0.049
PROD 0.21862 3.09 0.21874 3.12 0.162 0.23359 5.43 0.24181 5.65 0.212
LABO -0.00314 -0.04 -0.00289 -0.04 0.305 -0.07805 -1.27 -0.08094 -1.34 0.197
URBAN 0.17662 2.71 0.17631 2.65 0.196 0.52092 4.08 0.53416 4.45 0.793
PUBLIC 0.28134 5.04 0.28133 5.04 0.337 0.08864 2.57 0.08977 2.59 0.211
UNION 0.34991 7.34 0.35001 7.31 0.221 0.26264 6.22 0.25750 6.45 0.272
WCAPE -0.13532 -2.30 -0.14585 -2.31 0.170
NCAPE -0.18685 -1.10 -0.23867 -1.27 0.016
ECAPE -0.12081 -1.04 -0.21385 -1.89 0.046
NATAL -0.06285 -4.03 -0.08035 -4.15 0.136
OFS -0.40125 -0.99 -0.39958 -1.21 0.117
ETVL 0.08719 -2.04 0.03599 -2.20 0.045
NTVL -0.16024 0.46 -0.19234 0.20 0.025
NW -0.00368 -0.02 -0.03939 -0.26 0.075
DISFACI -0.00020 -1.86 -0.00020 -1.87 95.830 -0.00052 -1.62 -0.00048 -1.36 59.060
TARROAD 0.12897 1.50 0.12928 1.46 0.050 0.18122 2.29 0.17352 2.35 0.522
URATEB 0.12878 0.70 0.14864 0.19 0.398 -0.63299 -3.00 -1.84670 -3.36 0.176
URATEBSQ -0.02302 -0.03 0.185 2.56710 2.64 0.055
Adjusted  R
2 0.4238 0.4238 0.6360 0.6386
Dep variable Mean = 1.30137,  SD= 1.0194           Mean = 1.65227,  SD =  1.1278
N 1690            4808
Note: The base category for occupation is ‘service’ and for province is PWV or Gauteng.  Other reference categories are white, rural, female, and unmarried.